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In light of the current ethnic polarisation, this paper briefly enumerates the elements of 
ethnic conflict in Pakistan. It, then, discusses the economic, demographic, political, and 
cultural developments taking place in Pakistan which tend to affect the inter-relationships 
among ethnic communities and between society as a whole and ethnic communities. 
Evidence is presented to support the argument that despite surface tensions and 
confrontations, there is an unmistakable trend of greater inter-dependence which can 
contribute to national integration. 
The paper further analyses the relationship between ethnicity, class, and the state. It 
identifies military, bureaucracy, capitalists, and landlords as the principal elements of the 
“ruling class”, and shows that the different ethnic groups have different class structures and 
differential participation in military and bureaucracy. It points out the near absence of “cross 
cutting cleavages” which tends to turn the class and power conflicts into ethnic conflicts. In 
conclusion, the paper, while underlining the shifting definitional boundaries and relative 
demographic and cultural homogenisation of the population, argues against the redrawing of 
provincial boundaries and constitutional recognition of “nationality rights” of fixed ethnic 
groups. However, it makes a case for the recognition of ethnic diversity in Pakistan, equal 
treatment of all ethnic groups, and protection and promotion of the languages and cultures of 
the different ethnic groups. It argues that national unity, security, and integrity will be 
achieved if the primary emphasis is placed on promoting equity and harmony rather than on 
suppression of ethnic differences in the name of unity. 
 
Pakistan has been beset with one of the gravest ethnic conflicts of its history. In 
1995 alone, more than 1700 persons, including more than 200 law enforcement 
personnel, were killed in its major city, Karachi.1 A militant ethnic party in Sindh is in 
violent confrontation with the Government and other ethnic groups. Ethnic polarisation 
in the province of Sindh is almost complete, and in Balochistan it has shattered the 
traditional fraternity between ethnic groups. Violence and insecurity related to ethnic 
conflicts have seriously disrupted economic activities in urban Sindh where there has 
been evidence of flight of capital to other regions and shyness on the part of foreign 
capital to invest, besides billions of rupees lost each year due to recurrent strikes. 
The late Feroz Ahmed was Professor in the School of Social Work, Howard University, 
Washington, D. C. 
1Hosain, Yasser, “Whodunnit”? [sic], Newsline (Karachi), November 1995, pp. 46-48. 
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The picture of Pakistan emerging from its ethnic situation reinforces the gloom 
and doom portrayed by its economic and political situation. On the surface, it looks as 
if ethnic and regional fragmentation is on the increase without mitigation. However, it 
is important to look at the other side  of the  coin, i.e., cooperation and integration, and 
look beyond the surface appearances. 
Traditionally, Pakistan’s ethnic diversity has been defined in terms of the 
existence of the four historical “nationalities”, the Punjabis, Sindhis, Pushtoons and the 
Baloch, a major linguistic group, the Urdu-speaking people, and several smaller ethno-
linguistic groups. Recently, however, a party representing the Urdu-speaking people in 
Sindh has demanded the “nationality” status for its group, while there has been a 
consistent demand from a section of the population in Punjab for the recognition of 
Siraiki-speaking people as a distinct “nationality”. We have dealt with the question of 
ethnic identity elsewhere, and indicated our preference for the word ethnic group over 
nationality in order to avoid unnecessary conflict and appearance of a double standard.2 
In this paper, we will briefly review the major issues in ethnic conflicts in Pakistan, the 
trends affecting changes in ethnic identity and issues, the intersection of ethnicity, the 
state and class, and the implications of these changes for national integration in 
Pakistan. 
 
MAJOR ISSUES IN ETHNIC CONFLICTS 
Much has been written about the history, facts, and legitimacy of ethnic 
grievances and ethnic competition in Pakistan. Here, we will only summarise the major 
elements of ethnic problems in Pakistan. 
 
 1. Sovereignty: Provincial rights, regional autonomy, and self-determination are 
the forms in which the “elites” of the dominated ethnic groups have raised 
grievances against the domination by the ruling class of Punjab. Demands for 
complete independence, confederation with only residual powers for the 
centre, greater autonomy within the federal structure, creation of new 
provinces for the groups not having their own province, and altering the 
provincial boundaries to create ethnically more homogenous provinces have 
been voiced from time to time. Lately, the demand for holding local elections 
and giving more power to local governments, especially in urban Sindh, has 
been added to the arsenal of ethnic demands. 
 2. Allocation of resources: This is perhaps the most important arena for struggle 
between provinces and between ethnic groups. The resources for which the 
contending parties struggle, include financial resources for development and 
2Ahmed, Feroz, “Ethnicity, the State, and National Integration in Third World Societies: The Case of 
Pakistan”. Paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, held in New York on 
August 16–20, 1996. 
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recurrent expenditures, share of irrigation water, Government jobs (the quota 
system), opportunities for professional and higher education (location of 
institutions and admission policies, allotment of agricultural lands in Sindh and 
Balochistan to military officers and civil bureaucrats. 
 3. Inter-province migration: There is great resentment in Sindh and some in 
Balochistan against the in-migration from Punjab and NWFP and immigration 
from other countries. In 1981, the census calculated a net migration-to-total 
population ratio of 9.6 percent for Sindh.3 Migration of such magnitude tends 
to put pressure on their limited resources and change the demographic balance. 
 4. Language and culture: demands for the protection and promotion of the 
languages and cultures of ethnic groups against the domination of Urdu and 
neglect of regional cultural heritage are a constant feature in the struggle of 
ethnic groups for their identity assertion. Cultural symbols serve as instruments 
of forging group cohesion and legitimating group demands. 
 
TRENDS AFFECTING ETHNIC CHANGE  
Several economic, demographic, social, political, and cultural trends which have 
been underway in Pakistan have significantly affected ethnic identification and ethnic 
issues. These changes have affected the ethnic question in the following principal 
ways: (a) status of certain ethnic groups; (b) inter-ethnic group relations; (c) 




The most recent economic trends show continuing stagnation, balance of 
payments and reserves difficulties, paralysis of industrial and commercial activity in 
and flight of capital from Sindh due to political confrontation and violence, spiralling 
inflation, and deepening poverty.4 The trend of the decreasing role of manufacturing, 
mining, and agriculture, and a greater  role of the service sector, foreign remittances, 
and illegal/underground economy, including heroin and gun trade, has continued 
unabated. Ethnic conflicts have also led to the ethnic segmentation of markets in parts 
of Sindh and Balochistan. Regional and inter-ethnic economic disparities created by 
3Government of Pakistan, 1981 Census Report of Sindh. Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1984, 
p. 19. 
4For recent economic difficulties and inflation, see two articles by Hussain, Zahid, “The Economic 
Squeeze”, and “The Killer Spiral”, in Newsline, November, 1995. For an earlier article on the trend of flight 
of capital from Karachi, see Shiekh, Majid, “Flight from Karachi”, Newsline, November, 1989. For 
continuing foreign investment in Karachi, despite a hopeless law and order situation, see Masood, Tahir, “The 
Investment Paradox”,  The Herald, December 1995. 
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Pakistan’s pattern of economic development have been noted by scholars.5 Despite 
these negative trends, the overall thrust of economic growth and economic activities 
has, by and large, continued to be integrative of the capital, markets, and labour. 
Labourers, traders and transport operators from one set of provinces (Punjab and 
NWFP), by the millions, work in other provinces (Sindh, Balochistan, and Punjab). 
A socio-economic trend of tremendous sociological importance is  the change in 
class relations in agriculture. Much debate and discussion has taken place in South 
Asia about the nature and consequences of development in the agrarian economy.6 
However, it is quite clear that despite persistence of archaic instruments of production, 
old oppressive class relations, social power of the big landlords, and traditional values, 
the agrarian system inherited at independence and conveniently labelled as feudal no 
longer exists. Capitalist development, with all its distortions and unevenness, has 
intruded into the agricultural sector of Pakistan’s economy, if not supplanting, then 
grafting itself onto the old system.7 As a result of the technological changes, increased 
population density in the rural areas, and social changes facilitating alternative means 
of acquiring wealth and power, the traditional “feudal” class is no longer tied to the 
land, and its younger members are seeking a share in the professions, the capitalist 
sector of the economy, and state power, much the same way as other elements of the 
ruling class. Nor has its sways over the lives of the rural populace remained 
unchallenged and undiluted in the face of material productive and social changes and 
the revival of electoral politics. Since the class structure in different regions and among 
different ethnic groups varies quite substantially, the aforementioned changes are of 
great salience in the analysis of ethnic questions. 
 
Demographic Changes 
Uneven development of job opportunities has resulted not only in massive rural 
to urban migration within provinces, but large-scale inter-province migration, mainly 
from Punjab and NWFP, to Sindh. Continued existence of more than one million 
Afghan refugees has impacted the ethnic balance in Balochistan and affected the ethnic 
5See, for example, Hamid, Naved, and Hussain, Akmal, “Regional inequalities and capitalist 
development: Pakistan’s experience”, and Kardar, Shahid, “Polarisation in the regions and prospects for 
integration” in Zahid, S. Akbar (ed.), Regional Imbalances and the National Question in Pakistan, Lahore: 
Vanguard, 1992, pp. 1–42, 306–333. 
6For the famous mode of production debate in Economic and Political Weekly, see Patnaik Banaji, 
Rudra, Thorner, Chattopadhyay, et al., Studies in the Development of Capitalism in India. Lahore: Vanguard 
Books Limited, 1978. 
7For analyses of transformation of class relations in agriculture , see Ahmed, Feroz, “Transformation 
of agrarian structures in Pakistan: the Punjab”, in Ngo Manh Lan (ed.), Unreal Growth: Critical Studies in 
Asian Development, New Delhi: Hindustan Publishing Corporation, 1984, Vol. II, pp. 606–639, Ahmed 
Feroz, “Transformation of agrarian structure in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan”, Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, 14:1 (1984), pp. 5–47; Ahmed, Feroz, “Agrarian change and class formation in Sindh”, 
Economic and Political Weekly, 19:39 (Review of Agriculture), September 29, 1984. 
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composition of other provinces. Settlement in Karachi of several thousand Biharis from 
Bangladesh and the presence of an estimated two million illegal immigrants from 
neighbouring countries have added to the economic, political, and demographic 
complexity of Karachi. As a result of these population movements, the proportion of 
both Sindhi and Urdu-speaking ethnic groups has continued to decline and that of 
Punjabis, Pushtoons, Siraikis, and others has increased in Sindh. In Balochistan, the 
ratio of Pushtoons to Balochs has increased. The NWFP has become even more 
Pushtoonised. The settlement of Pakistani Pushtoons and Afghan refugees, as well as 
illegal immigrants, in Punjab has had small effect on its ethnic composition, because of 
the large size of Punjab’s population. 
While urbanisation has increased in the country as a whole, its magnitude has 
been especially high in Sindh which, in  the 1981 Population Census, was 43 percent 
urban.8 The proportion of urban population in Sindh may now be close to 50 percent, 
although there is no new census to verify it. The urbanisation of Sindh carries with it an 
ethnic dimension in that most of this growth, especially in Karachi, is among the “non-
indigenous” groups, whereas the “indigenous” Sindhi and Baloch populations together 
comprise a little more than one-tenth of the population.9  This trend exacerbates the 
already existing urban-rural divide between Sindhis and Mohajirs. Although it is true 
that most (95 percent) of the Urdu-speaking people in Sindh are urban, it would be an 
over-simplification to categorise all Sindhis as rural. According to the 1981 Population 
Census, while 49.7 percent of the urban households in Sindh spoke Urdu, 18.3 percent 
spoke Sindhi and 3 percent spoke Balochi. For Sindh as a whole, 15 percent of all 
Sindhi-speaking households were urban.10 
 
Political Changes 
In a political system with a proliferation of political parties, and most parties 
having only regional pockets of support, the electoral process and the quest for power 
have required the building of alliances across not only ideological lines but across 
regional and ethnic lines. both within and among provinces. This political deal-making 
has engendered interesting examples of ethnic and regional interdependence and 
mutual trust among parties. Among the most interesting of these blocs is the one led by 
the Punjabi former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s Muslim League which has brought 
into its fold all the major Sindhi politicians opposed to Prime Minister Benazir 
Bhutto’s PPP, and built alliances with both of the erstwhile Pushtoon nationalist 
parties, the Awami National Party of Wali Khan and the Pukhtoonkhwa Milli Awami 
8Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division, Population Census Organisation, 1981 Census Report 
of Sindh, op. cit., p. 8  
9Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division, Population Census Organisation, 1981 Population 
Census: District Reports: Karachi. Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1985, p. 103. 
10Government of Pakistan, 1981 Census Report of Sindh, op. cit. pp. 9, 107. 
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Party of Mahmood Achakzai, the remnants of the late Ghaus Bux Bizenjo’s Baloch-
based Pakistan National Party, the mercurial Baloch leader Akbar Bugti’s Jamhoori 
Watan Party, and the militant Mohajir nationalist MQM. 
Bhutto’s PPP, despite its waning popularity, still remains not only as the 
country’s largest party, but a national party with the broadest regional and ethnic 
representation. The religious parties enjoy limited popular support and continue to 
squabble over sectarian and doctrinal issues, but they direct their appeals across 
regional and ethnic boundaries. The ethnic nationalist or separatist formations among 
Sindhi and Baloch ethnic communities seem to lack legitimacy and popular support 
within their own communities. 
Despite intense  ethnic conflict and fears of separatism in urban Sindh, the 
overall trend among politicians in Pakistan seems to be toward greater tolerance, 
interdependence, and political integration. The traditional politicians seem to have 
acquired the ability to share power and make money, and have little reason and time 
for intensifying ethnic and regional disputes, at least for now. However, several time 
bombs, including the proposed Kalabagh dam and the demand for creating a Mohajir 
province, remain that can rip apart the alliances of convenience, and throw the country 
into the flames of internecine warfare. 
 
Cultural Developments 
Several cultural trends have been underway that affect ethnic formation, ethnic 
relations, and national integration. The most interesting of these from the point of view 
of ethnic studies and national integration is the role of the Urdu language. Although 
Urdu is the mother tongue of only seven percent of Pakistan’s population, historical 
circumstances have placed it in the position of being officially designated as the 
national language of Pakistan. The two major factors in favour of Urdu were the 
emergence of Urdu as a secondary symbol of Muslim identity in pre-independence 
India,11 and its adoption as the primary language of literacy and literary expression, 
against their own vernaculars, by all the ethnic groups of Pakistan, except Sindhis and, 
in limited areas, Pushtoons.12 Although protests continue to be voiced against the 
preeminence of Urdu, it has clearly established itself as Pakistan’s principal language 
of education, mass communication, politics, business, and inter-province coordination. 
An increasing number of Pakistanis whose mother tongue is not Urdu are learning to 
11Brass, Paul R, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 
1991, pp. 85–92. 
12In 1961, for each person educated in Sindhi in Sindh, there were only 1.4 persons educated in Urdu. 
However, in NWFP, for each person educated in Pushto, there were 8 persons educated in Urdu. Similar 
ratios for Punjabi in Punjab and Balochi in Balochistan were 1:95 and 1:71 respectively. These ratios were 
computed from the figures provided in the Government of Pakistan, 1961 Population Census, Volume 3 
(West Pakistan), Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1963. 
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speak and understand it. In the 1961 Census, twice as many persons were reported to 
be speaking Urdu as persons whose mother tongue was Urdu.13 This type of data was 
not collected in the subsequent censuses. Nonetheless, the trend of linguistic 
assimilation to Urdu is unmistakable, as can be seen from the fact that 70.3 percent of 
the 14,745,234 literate persons in 1981 were literate only in Urdu.14 
However, the impact of this assimilation is not uniform on different ethnic 
groups and in different regions. Concomitant cultural assimilation and Mohajir identity 
adoption by members of the Gujrati and Memoni Kutchchi-speaking small business 
communities in Karachi have been unmistakable. This may be considered one extreme 
of the linguistic assimilation to Urdu. At the other end, the Pushtoons may use Urdu in 
schools and for all kinds of written communication, but seldom do they adopt it as the 
language of the household. Similarly, the educated Balochs in Balochistan and urban 
Sindh have adopted Urdu without assimilating to it. The Punjabis have maintained 
their duality about language. They continue to consider Urdu as their own formal 
language, and many of the urban, educated individuals among them proudly proclaim 
Urdu to be their mother tongue and report it as such to the census enumerators. 
However, this linguistic assimilation has not been correlated with subjective identity 
transformation. On the contrary, Punjabi ethnic identity remains strong even in the 
urban areas, where a movement for the official status for Punjabi and its use as a 
written language is gaining ground. 
While Sindhis have the longest and strongest tradition among the indigenous 
peoples of Pakistan to use their own language, and have been most resilient against the 
imposition of Urdu, they have not been altogether immune to the process of 
assimilation to Urdu. As a result of the overall influence of Urdu discussed earlier, as 
well as the compulsory teaching of Urdu to Sindhis, the non-availability of Sindhi-
medium schools in Karachi, and the domination of Urdu in the work place and the 
market in the major cities of Sindh, many Sindhi families have begun to speak Urdu at 
home and, when settled abroad, teach their children Urdu as a mark of their Pakistani 
identity. Further, when Sindhis and Urdu-speaking inter-marry, in most cases Urdu 
becomes the language of the household, regardless of who the husband or wife is. 
These developments are quite ironic in view of the demand of many Sindhi  
nationalists that the Urdu-speaking people speak Sindhi and assimilate into Sindhi 
culture. An opposite trend has also been noted in that, in reaction to the growing 
Mohajir political assertion in Sindh, even the cosmopolitan Sindhi families of Karachi, 
who had all but  forgotten about their Sindhi roots, have begun to reassert their Sindhi 
identity, even though they may be speaking English or Urdu at home. This 
phenomenon gives credence to the theory of primordial identity being reawakened 
from the unconscious by certain triggers.15 
13Government of Pakistan, 1961 Census of Population, Volume 3, op. cit. 
14Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division, Population Census Organisation, 1981 Census Report 
of Pakistan (Census Report No. 69). Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, December 1984, p. 70. 
15Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, op. cit. , p. 70. 
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The trend of popular adoption of Urdu is giving rise to a paradoxical situation in 
which the term Urdu-speaking, which is used by many as more accurate and honorific 
than the term Mohajir for a specific ethnic group, may itself become a misnomer. 
Indeed, the Census of 1981 precisely tried to create this  situation by asking a question 
about the “language usually spoken in the household” rather than about the mother 
tongue of the individual. This question, while biasing the response in favour of Urdu, 
underlines an interesting paradox: who is Urdu-speaking? 
The integrating effects of Urdu have been correlated with the transmission 
through schools, literature, and the media certain social values and norms of behaviour, 
modelled after the culture of middle class immigrants from Utar Pradesh (India) or 
some unspecified group, which are deemed to be more “civilised” and desirable. 
Readers of Urdu novels and viewers of television dramas from all ethnic groups are 
subjected to a subliminal appeal to change their old ways in favour of these new 
mannerisms and attitudes. Thus, along with the development of a common language, a 
levelling of social values and norms of behaviour is also shaping across ethnic 
boundaries in Pakistan. 
Through the agencies of mass media and the educational system, a religious 
homogenisation of sorts is also taking place among ethnic groups. The political 
system’s increasing tendency to “Islamise” the state has resulted in standardising the 
understanding and practicing of Islam that tend  to be more orthodox and strict about 
rituals than the sufiist and experiential beliefs and practices which were traditionally 
more common in Pakistan. This difference in religious experience has tended to 
coincide not only with class and urban-rural differences, but, given the overlap 
between ethnicity and class and between ethnicity and residence, it also coincides with 
ethnic differences. Therefore, the traditionally Sufiist Punjabi, Siraiki, Sindhi, and 
Baloch people feel obliged to assimilate into the religious beliefs and practices which 
are more common among the Urdu-speaking people, the urban Punjabi bourgeoisie, 
and the orthodox Pushtoons. Capitalist development, modernisation, national 
integration, the spread of education, and cultural homogenisation in Pakistan seem to 
be facilitating the gradual withering away of Sufiism and the ascendance of the 
scholastic Islam, which is often associated with the so-called fundamentalist 
movements. 
The economic, demographic, political, and cultural trends discussed above will 
provide the backdrop for analysing the relation between ethnicity and state, and 
discussing policy implications. 
 
ETHNICITY, CLASS, AND THE STATE 
The state is both a resource in itself and a distributor of resources.16 In a multi-
ethnic state, it is of importance to assess how these resources and state power itself are 
16Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, op. cit., p. 272. 
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shared by the different ethnic groups, and how state power might be used to the 
advantage of one or more ethnic groups and to the detriment of one  or more of the 
other ethnic groups. Such an analysis, at first, requires an understanding of the nature 
of the state, the relationship of various classes to it, and the intersection between class 
and ethnicity. The view of the state taken in this writing is neither the one that treats it 
merely as a neutral arena where the interests of various interest groups are mediated, 
nor is it the classical Marxist approach which sees it as an instrument of oppression of 
one class by another and in which the executive branch of the state acts as a managing 
committee for the protection of the collective interests of the bourgeoisie. 
The Pakistani state can be seen as a neocolonial state, linked as an appendage to 
the global capitalist economy and politically subservient to the United States. Within 
this abridged sovereignty the state, while perpetuating the existing relations of 
production and distribution, enjoys relative autonomy. The military and bureaucracy 
not only command the instruments of state power, but pursue their own interests almost 
independently of the dominant capitalist and landlord classes. The state, therefore, is 
neither above and detached from the society nor is it mechanistically subservient to the 
dominant classes. Because of the special locus and role of the educated middle class in 
the society and vis-à-vis the state, the latter accords it a privilege, or at least a 
sensitivity, that is not extended to the workers, peasants, and other subordinated 
classes. Further, in Pakistan’s specific context, as in many Latin American, Asian, and 
African countries, the military is more than an equal of the civil bureaucracy and has 
acquired the role of the ultimate arbiter of political power. Furthermore, the pursuit of 
political power is not simply aimed at the protection of class and individual legitimate 
interests, but is also directed at the plunder of the state’s resources. 
Since the bourgeoisie and the landlord class are social classes, and the military 
and bureaucracy are wielders of the state apparatus, at one level of analysis it is 
important to keep the two separate. However, while analysing the class and power 
asymmetries in a multi-ethnic society, it becomes useful to treat both of these types as 
elements of a common aggregation. Therefore, while recognising that higher officials 
of the military and civil bureaucracy may be drawn from any class, we shall refer to the 
landlord class, the capitalist class, military, and bureaucracy as various elements of the 
“ruling class”. This tentative usage is preferable to the term “elite”, a favourite of many 
social scientists, because the latter becomes too broad and ambiguous by including 
social classes which are not economically or politically dominant. However, at a third 
level, where inter-ethnic group competition is analysed, the fact of the “ruling class” 
and the middle class of a given ethnic group combining to pursue their common 
interests calls for a common nomenclature.17 The term “elite” may be used to describe 
17Brass, op. cit., analyses ethnic formation and ethnic conflicts in the conceptual framework of “elite 
competition”, pp. 25–36, 258-259. 
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this broader aggregation which excludes workers, peasants, and other subordinated and 
marginalised classes. 
 
Intersection of Ethnicity and Class 
The different ethnic groups in Pakistan do not have an identical class 
composition. Nor do they have an equal, or even proportional, representation in the 
higher echelons of military and bureaucracy. Therefore, the various elements of 
Pakistan’s ruling class have a disproportionate representation of the various ethnic 
groups in society. This situation represents a case, not of cross cutting cleavages, but of 
overlapping of class and ethnicity to a large extent.18 
Demographically, the Punjabis comprise the largest single ethnic group (48.2 
percent) in Pakistan’s population, followed by Pushtoons (13.1 percent), Sindhis (11.8 
percent), Siraikis (9.8 percent), Urdu-speaking (7.6 percent), Baloch-Brauhis (4.2 
percent), and Hindko-speaking (2.4 percent).19 No statistics by ethnic group are 
available for the civil service and military ranks. However, it is an accepted fact that 
the officers and the rank and file of the armed forces are mainly Punjabi and Pushtoon, 
the former generally believed to be nearly 70 percent and the latter 25 percent to 30 
percent. Urdu-speaking individuals continue to be in the higher ranks of the military—
such as the former Army Chief of Staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, but their 
representation is probably less than their population. There are no senior Sindhi or 
Baloch officers in the armed forces. Similarly, in the senior civil bureaucracy, the 
Punjabis and Pushtoons have a disproportionately high representation; the Urdu-
speaking, a one-time dominant fraction, have slipped but still maintain a 
proportionately large presence; the Sindhis, despite some recent appointments to high 
positions, are still under-represented; and the Balochs, also under-represented, are too 
small a group to have any influence even if given a proportional share. 
The ethnic composition of the dominant classes is also asymmetrical. The 
capitalist class of Pakistan consists mainly of Punjabis and members of the small 
business communities who have migrated from Gujrat and Bombay and who have now 
begun to identify themselves as Mohajir. The Pushtoons are well represented in all 
strata of the capitalist class, having established businesses in all four provinces, and 
substantially controlling inter-province and intra-province transportation. The lucrative 
gun and heroin business is also mainly controlled by Pushtoons. Traditionally, there 
have been only a few big Urdu-speaking capitalist, but an Urdu-speaking bourgeoisie 
is well-entrenched, owning medium and small businesses. Although two Sindhi 
business families are among the richest in Pakistan, and a few have the potential of 
18For a theory of cross-cutting cleavages, see Bentley, Arthur F., The Process of Government. 
Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1967. 
19Main Findings of the 1981 Population Census. Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1983, p. 13. 
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transforming themselves, with the help of the plunder of the state resources, into 
capitalists, there is no Sindhi bourgeoisie to speak of.  Similarly, there is no Baloch 
capitalist class. 
The landlord class, which continues to be of analytical and political interest, also 
has an uneven presence among different ethnic groups. In absolute numbers and 
economic, social, and political power, first come the landlords of lower and western 
Punjab, most of whom are Siraiki-speaking, but closely integrated with the Punjabi 
ruling class. The current President of Pakistan, Farooq Leghari, is a good example. 
Next come the landlords of Sindh, who in the absence of a Sindhi bourgeoisie and a 
strong middle class, enjoy the position of being economically, socially, and politically 
the most powerful class of the Sindhi society. Feudal-type relations of production still 
persist in parts of NWFP, and there are many powerful Pushtoon landlords. However, 
the more prominent of them also have business investments and a presence in the 
armed forces and bureaucracy. Probably, the Pushtoon ruling class is the most well-
rounded ruling class. Many of the traditional Baloch sardars (tribal/clan chiefs), by 
usurping communal lands and privileges, have turned themselves into landlord; but 
most sardars are of modest means who depend upon Government’s largesse for their 
well-being. Although the more prominent sardars of Balochistan have established 
alliances with the Punjabi landlords of Balochi “racial” stock (the Legharis and 
Mazaris), the national influence of Baloch chieftains is quite limited. 
Finally, the relative strength of the educated middle class, which provides most 
of the personnel for white-collar professions and the pool for recruitment into civil 
service and military, also varies greatly among the different ethnic groups. The 
absolute and relative size of this class is very much a function of the differentials in the 
population size and the extent of higher education in the different ethnic groups. The 
Punjabis, both because of their population size and relatively extensive higher 
education, have the largest educated middle class in absolute numbers. However, the 
Urdu-speaking community, because of its historical background, urban residence, and 
traditional reliance on education for social mobility, has an educated middle class 
which is larger than that of any other ethnic group relative to other classes within the 
ethnic group, and also the largest in Pakistan in terms of the group’s population 
proportion. This is indicated, among other things, by the fact that while Punjab, 
comprising 56 percent of Pakistan’s population, produces 14,000 college graduates per 
year, Sindh, with 22.6 percent of the population, produces about 12,000 graduates, a 
majority of whom are Urdu-speaking.20 The middle class among Pushtoons and 
Sindhis is much less developed than among Punjabis and Urdu-speaking people, but is 
expanding rapidly. The Baloch middle class is still rudimentary, but gaining influence 
within its own ethnic group.  
 
 
20Kardar, Shahid, “Polarisation in the regions and prospects for integration”, in Zaidi (ed.), Regional 
Imbalances and the National Question in Pakistan, op. cit., pp. 306–333. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
It has been shown in the above analysis that while ethnic polarisation in Sindh 
and Balochistan has intensified recently, because of the past and present internal and 
international migrations, the trend seems to be towards greater ethnic heterogeneity in 
different parts of Pakistan. Given this fact, and the growing economic and political 
interdependence, and increasing cultural homogenisation, it has become imperative and 
even possible to seek solutions to regional and ethnic problems in a multi-ethnic 
framework. For example, redrawing of provincial boundaries, which might have been 
possible in the early years of Pakistan, is no longer a problem-solving option. 
Similarly, the idea of constitutional recognition of Pakistan as a multi-national or 
multi-ethnic state with clearly identified groups and group rights, which has been 
articulated as a political demand,  and which may sound like a rational approach to 
dissipate ethnic tensions, may not necessarily produce the desired results. 
Assumption of fixed definitional boundaries or fixed number of ethnic groups 
may pose serious problems in the future even if a consensus on categories and number 
could be achieved at present. On the other hand, the present segmented approach may 
provide a more realistic basis for addressing  ethnic problems, provided, (a) all the 
major elements of the ethnic problem are recognised and addressed broadly by 
constitutional provisions and concretely through public policies, (b) mechanisms for 
implementing and monitoring the relevant legal provisions are put in place, and (c) 
effective judicial process is made available to enforce compliance. 
Internal migration and urbanisation are world-wide phenomena, determined by 
population growth and uneven development. Although the process of urbanisation, 
particularly in Sindh and Balochistan, is taking place to the demographic and economic 
detriment of the local population, it would be a fallacy to view the urbanisation 
phenomenon as an ethnic menace. However, in order to mitigate the divisive effects of 
urbanisation, non-coercive preventive and remedial actions would be needed. Policies 
directed towards slowing down the flow of inter-province migration would require 
both slowing down of population growth rate and focusing on job-creating projects in 
the source areas of migration (NWFP and Punjab). However, rural-urban migration 
within provinces is unavoidable. Rural job creation programmes and expansion of 
urban housing and civic amenities would be the key ingredients of policies directed 
towards addressing this problem. 
International migration—mostly illegal—contributes to population growth rate, 
urbanisation, ethnic diversification, competition for resources, social unrest, and 
political tensions. The ratio of immigrants to the total population in 1981 was 4.8  
percent for Pakistan, 5.8 percent for Punjab, and 6.2 percent for Sindh.21 By all 
indications, the volume of illegal migration and refugee influx has increased 
21Government of Pakistan, Main Findings of 1981 Population Census, op. cit., pp. 5, 15 (computed). 
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substantially in all the provinces since 1981. The Government finds itself helpless to curb 
this migration. The immigrants, in their struggle to survive, get caught up in the vortex of 
ethnic politics. Public awareness can force the hand of the Government to curb illegal 
immigration. However, it can also aid and abet illegal immigration from the neighbouring 
countries if the motive is to increase the numbers of their own ethnic group. 
Undoubtedly, the ethnic asymmetries within Pakistan’s “elite” and the 
substantial overlapping  of class and ethnicity pose the greatest challenge to removing 
ethnic disparities and promoting harmony and national integration. Given the ethnic 
specificity of the armed forces and the spending of the largest portion of the budget on 
defence, a more equitable  distribution of resources among ethnic communities is 
unthinkable without drastically altering the ethnic composition of the military and/or 
reducing the military budget. The civil bureaucracy has been more amenable to ethnic 
diversification, and given sufficient political pressure, the bureaucracy can be made to 
be more inclusive. However, Government rules and the attitude of the government of 
the time have a considerable bearing on who gets recruited and promoted in the 
bureaucracy. The few gains made by Sindhis recently can be easily reversed by the 
Government which might succeed Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, not only because 
many of these appointments are thought to be motivated by favouritism, but the 
successor Government might be based on the support of the MQM which will most 
certainly demand an increased share for “Mohajirs”, calculated on a fantastic 
percentage in the population: 50 percent of Sindh’s population, which comes out to be 
11.3 percent of Pakistan’s population.22 
Beside the subjective attitudes of the Government in power, there are serious 
“structural” facts concerning ethnicity and class which tend to complicate otherwise 
simple issues of ethnic parity. The Urdu-speaking community’s urban, middle class 
character, and its current lower middle class leadership, present some unique 
problematic. First, ethnic movements are usually based on grievances of the 
disadvantaged groups concerning ethnic disparities. By all objective indicators, the 
Urdu-speaking community is anything but a disadvantaged ethnic group, and it had 
always been considered by the general public as well as political analysts as a relatively 
privileged group, along with Punjabis. However, since the mid-1980s, a militant 
nationalist movement has galvanised the Urdu-speaking population which sees itself as 
the most deprived and oppressed group in Pakistan.23 
This chasm between reality and perception has intrigued many an analyst. One 
could find parallels between this movement and those of the Sikhs, Croats, Afrikaners, 
and other  groups, and attribute it to the “relative” “deprivation theory” or “false 
22This demand has been included, among other documents and statements, in the MQM’s 15-point 
charter of demands. The News (Karachi), January 12, 1995. 
23For an analysis of the rise of the Mohajir movement, see Ahmed, Feroz, “Ethnicity and politics: 
The rise of Mohajir separatism”, South Asia Bulletin, 8:1&2  (Spring/Fall  1988), pp. 33–45. 
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consciousness” of a better-off group.24  Here, however, we are not engaged in  
analysing the causes of any specific movement, but to point a problematic of ethnicity-
class nexus that a specific ethnic movement in Pakistan poses. What the MQM 
dilemma underlines is the inadequacy of looking at “class as a whole” and “ethnic 
group as a whole”. The Urdu-speaking people, “as a whole”, can certainly not be 
viewed as a group at the bottom rungs of the ladder of privileges. Nor can the middle 
class—even the lower middle class—be viewed as a deprived class in comparison with 
the multitudes of impoverished and destitute peasants, workers, and other poor. The 
Urdu-speaking lower middle class, having struggled hard to get higher education, 
found the avenues for jobs and advancement blocked. It followed the model of the 
deprived or dominated groups (Bengali, Sindhi) to blame ethnic  discrimination for is 
plight rather than following the model of the dominant (Punjabi) group of blaming the 
“system” or class oppression . It manipulated the cultural symbols of its group to 
mobilise the rest of the classes of its ethnic group in a militant nationalist movement. 
The job situation of the “Mohajir” lower middle class, like the by-passing of Sindhi 
peasants for land allotment and Sindhi workers for jobs in the new industries in Sindh, 
underlines the fact that there is more to the ethnic problem than just “elite 
competition”, even if the educated middle class proper is included in that “elite”. 
Second, in popular view a middle class leadership, in contrast to the “oppressive 
and exploitative” feudal or capitalist leadership, is generally held to be more legitimate. 
The MQM is never tired of stressing the contrast between its middle class character 
and the “feudal” character of the PPP’s leadership, with the implication that all of the 
MQM’s demands can only be legitimate and any share given to Sindhis is nothing 
more than an illegitimate feudal expropriation. The coding of ethnic hatred behind  
leftist rhetoric by a right-wing organisation is an interesting development engendered 
by the conflict between two ethnic communities led by markedly different classes. The 
political supremacy of the landlord class—a function of its traditional economic and 
social power—and the relative weakness of the middle class among Sindhis, forces the 
latter class not only into dependence on the former, but subjects it to a burden of 
constantly proving to the people of Pakistan  the legitimacy of its rights. 
Third, one of the most important sources of tension between provinces is the 
share of irrigation water and the differential impact of constructing new dams. 
Although the Urdu-speaking members of Sindh Assembly, so far, have tended to vote 
along with Sindhi members in defence of the province’s rights, the water problem is 
not perceived by the Urdu-speaking people as a “life and death problem” the way it is 
seen by the people directly dependent on agriculture. Although this may just be an 
expected indifference of the urban population, in Sindh’s specific context, ethnic 
motives are readily attached to such attitudes. On the other land, the landlord 
24For these and related theories, see Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, op. cit., pp. 41–48.                  
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leadership’s lack of understanding of and insensitivity toward pressing urban problems 
in a highly urbanised province like Sindh  immediately acquires an ethnic dimension. 
In Balochistan, the conflict between Balochs and Pushtoons, after a long history 
of political cooperation, burst out recently in the form of armed clashes. Whatever else 
may have been the specific reasons for these incidents, it is not difficult to see how the 
differentials in the class structure between Balochs and Pushtoons may have put the 
latter in an advantageous position to avail itself of the professional opportunities and 
the spoils of the state. While the Balochs still have extensive remnants of nomadic life 
and a strong clan organisation, the Pushtoons have a weaker tribal control and a 
relatively large educated middle class. 
The overlapping of class and ethnicity, by preventing the formation of cross-
cutting cleavages, not only makes inter-ethnic collaboration more difficult, it promotes 
class collaboration within the groups which perceive themselves to be threatened from 
outside. As a result of the rising ethnic consciousness, the real challenge—as opposed 
to the empty ethnic codified diatribes—to the oppressive feudal-type system in the 
countryside has weakened substantially. 
While national integration is a desirable goal, the primary emphasis on 
integration in the past has led to oppressive policies about ethnic diversity and 
disparities. On the other hand, if the primary emphasis is placed on promoting equity 
and harmony among  different ethnic groups, national unity, security, and integrity 
would be the logical outcomes. Suppression of ethnic rights in the name of security, 
unity, or integrity of the country will have the opposite effect. 
 
 
